VPN Protocols

Protocols

There are a number of VPN protocols in use that secure the transport of data traffic over a public network infrastructure. Each protocol varies slightly in the way that data is kept secure.

IP security (IPSec) is used to secure communications over the Internet. IPSec traffic can use either transport mode or tunneling to encrypt data traffic in a VPN. The difference between the two modes is that transport mode encrypts only the message within the data packet (also known as the payload) while tunneling encrypts the entire data packet. IPSec is often referred to as a "security overlay" because of its use as a security layer for other protocols.

Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) use cryptography to secure communications over the Internet. Both protocols use a "handshake" method of authentication that involves a negotiation of network parameters between the client and server machines. To successfully initiate a connection, an authentication process involving certificates is used. Certificates are cryptographic keys that are stored on both the server and client.

Point-To-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) is another tunneling protocol used to connect a remote client to a private server over the Internet. PPTP is one of the most widely used VPN protocols because of it's straightforward configuration and maintenance and also because it is included with the Windows operating system.

Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) is a protocol used to tunnel data communications traffic between two sites over the Internet. L2TP is often used in tandem with IPSec (which acts as a security layer) to secure the transfer of L2TP data packets over the Internet. Unlike PPTP, a VPN implementation using L2TP/IPSec requires a shared key or the use of certificates.

VPN technology employs sophisticated encryption to ensure security and prevent any unintentional interception of data between private sites. All traffic over a VPN is encrypted using algorithms to secure data integrity and privacy. VPN architecture is governed by a strict set of rules and standards to ensure a private communication channel between sites. Corporate network administrators are responsible for deciding the scope of a VPN, implementing and deploying a VPN, and ongoing monitoring of network traffic across the network firewall. A VPN requires administrators to be continually be aware of the overall architecture and scope of the VPN to ensure communications are kept private.

What is VPN?

A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a network technology that creates a secure network connection over a public network such as the Internet or a private network owned by a service provider. Large corporations, educational institutions, and government agencies use VPN technology to enable remote users to securely connect to a private network.

A VPN can connect multiple sites over a large distance just like a Wide Area Network (WAN). VPNs are often used to extend intranets worldwide to disseminate information and news to a wide user base. Educational institutions use VPNs to connect campuses that can be distributed across the country or around the world.

In order to gain access to the private network, a user must be authenticated using a unique identification and a password. An authentication token is often used to gain access to a private network through a personal identification number (PIN) that a user must enter. The PIN is a unique authentication code that changes according to a specific frequency, usually every 30 seconds or so.

L2TPv3

Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol Version 3 is an IETF standard related to L2TP that can be used as an alternative protocol to Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) for encapsulation of multiprotocol Layer 2 communications traffic over IP networks. Like L2TP, L2TPv3 provides a ‘pseudo-wire’ service, but scaled to fit carrier requirements. buy-vpn
L2TPv3 can be regarded as being to MPLS what IP is to ATM: a simplified version of the same concept, with much of the goodness achieved with a fraction of the effort, at the cost of losing some technical features considered less important in the market. In the case of L2TPv3, the features lost are teletraffic engineering features considered important in MPLS. The protocol overhead of L2TPv3 is also significantly bigger than MPLS. However, there is no reason why these features could not be re-engineered in or on top of L2TPv3 in later products.

Transport Layer Security

Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), are cryptographic protocols that provide communication security over the Internet. TLS and SSL encrypt the segments of network connections at the Application Layer for theTransport Layer, using asymmetric cryptography for key exchange, symmetric encryption for confidentiality, and message authentication codes for message integrity.

Several versions of the protocols are in widespread use in applications such as web browsing, electronic mail, Internet faxing, instant messaging and voice-over-IP (VoIP).

TLS is an IETF standards track protocol, last updated in RFC 5246, and is based on the earlier SSL specifications developed by Netscape Communications.

Description

The TLS protocol allows client-server applications to communicate across a network in a way designed to prevent eavesdropping and tampering.

Since most protocols can be used either with or without TLS (or SSL) it is necessary to indicate to the server whether the client is making a TLS connection or not. There are two main ways of achieving this; one option is to use a different port number for TLS connections (for example port 443 for HTTPS). The other is to use the regular port number and have the client request that the server switch the connection to TLS using a protocol specific mechanism (for example STARTTLS for mail and news protocols).

Once the client and server have decided to use TLS they negotiate a stateful connection by using a handshaking procedure. During this handshake, the client and server agree on various parameters used to establish the connection's security.

    The client sends the server the client's SSL version number, cipher settings, session-specific data, and other information that the server needs to communicate with the client using SSL.
    The server sends the client the server's SSL version number, cipher settings, session-specific data, and other information that the client needs to communicate with the server over SSL. The server also sends its own certificate, and if the client is requesting a server resource that requires client authentication, the server requests the client's certificate.
    The client uses the information sent by the server to authenticate the server (see Server Authentication for details). If the server cannot be authenticated, the user is warned of the problem and informed that an encrypted and authenticated connection cannot be established. If the server can be successfully authenticated, the client proceeds to step 4.
    Using all data generated in the handshake thus far, the client (with the cooperation of the server, depending on the cipher being used) creates the pre-master secret for the session, encrypts it with the server's public key (obtained from the server's certificate, sent in step 2), and then sends the encrypted pre-master secret to the server.
    If the server has requested client authentication (an optional step in the handshake), the client also signs another piece of data that is unique to this handshake and known by both the client and server. In this case, the client sends both the signed data and the client's own certificate to the server along with the encrypted pre-master secret.
    If the server has requested client authentication, the server attempts to authenticate the client (see Client Authentication for details). If the client cannot be authenticated, the session ends. If the client can be successfully authenticated, the server uses its private key to decrypt the pre-master secret, and then performs a series of steps (which the client also performs, starting from the same pre-master secret) to generate the master secret.
    Both the client and the server use the master secret to generate the session keys, which are symmetric keys used to encrypt and decrypt information exchanged during the SSL session and to verify its integrity (that is, to detect any changes in the data between the time it was sent and the time it is received over the SSL connection).
    The client sends a message to the server informing it that future messages from the client will be encrypted with the session key. It then sends a separate (encrypted) message indicating that the client portion of the handshake is finished.
    The server sends a message to the client informing it that future messages from the server will be encrypted with the session key. It then sends a separate (encrypted) message indicating that the server portion of the handshake is finished.

The SSL handshake is now complete and the session begins. The client and the server use the session keys to encrypt and decrypt the data they send to each other and to validate its integrity.

This is the normal operation condition of the secure channel. At any time, due to internal or external stimulus (either automation or user intervention), either side may renegotiate the connection, in which case, the process repeats itself.

This concludes the handshake and begins the secured connection, which is encrypted and decrypted with the key material until the connection closes.

If any one of the above steps fails, the TLS handshake fails and the connection is not created.

Security

TLS has a variety of security measures:

    Protection against a downgrade of the protocol to a previous (less secure) version or a weaker cipher suite.
    Numbering subsequent Application records with a sequence number and using this sequence number in the message authentication codes (MACs).
    Using a message digest enhanced with a key (so only a key-holder can check the MAC). The HMAC construction used by most TLS cipher suites is specified in RFC 2104 (SSL 3.0 used a different hash-based MAC).
    The message that ends the handshake ("Finished") sends a hash of all the exchanged handshake messages seen by both parties.
    The pseudorandom function splits the input data in half and processes each one with a different hashing algorithm (MD5 and SHA-1), then XORs them together to create the MAC. This provides protection even if one of these algorithms is found to be vulnerable. TLS only.
    SSL 3.0 improved upon SSL 2.0 by adding SHA-1 based ciphers and support for certificate authentication.

From a security standpoint, SSL 3.0 should be considered less desirable than TLS 1.0. The SSL 3.0 cipher suites have a weaker key derivation process; half of the master key that is established is fully dependent on the MD5 hash function, which is not resistant to collisions and is, therefore, not considered secure. Under TLS 1.0, the master key that is established depends on both MD5 and SHA-1 so its derivation process is not currently considered weak. It is for this reason that SSL 3.0 implementations cannot be validated under FIPS 140-2.[16]

A vulnerability of the renegotiation procedure was discovered in August 2009 that can lead to plaintext injection attacks against SSL 3.0 and all current versions of TLS. For example, it allows an attacker who can hijack an https connection to splice their own requests into the beginning of the conversation the client has with the web server. The attacker can't actually decrypt the client-server communication, so it is different from a typical man-in-the-middle attack. A short-term fix is for web servers to stop allowing renegotiation, which typically will not require other changes unless client certificate authentication is used. To fix the vulnerability, a renegotiation indication extension was proposed for TLS. It will require the client and server to include and verify information about previous handshakes in any renegotiation handshakes.[17] This extension has become a proposed standard and has been assigned the number RFC 5746. The RFC has been implemented in recent OpenSSL[18] and other libraries.[19][20]

There are some attacks against the implementation rather than the protocol itself:[21]

    In the earlier implementations, some CAs[22] did not explicitly set basicConstraints CA=FALSE for leaf nodes. As a result, these leaf nodes could sign rogue certificates. In addition, some early software (including IE6 and Konqueror) did not check this field altogether. This can be exploited for man-in-the-middle attack on all potential SSL connections.
    Some implementations (including older versions of Microsoft Cryptographic API, Network Security Services and GnuTLS) stop reading any characters that follow the null character in the name field of the certificate, which can be exploited to fool the client into reading the certificate as if it were one that came from the authentic site, e. g. paypal. com\0.badguy.com would be mistaken as the site of paypal.com rather than badguy.com.
    Browsers implemented SSL/TLS protocol version fallback mechanisms for compatibility reasons. The protection offered by the SSL/TLS protocols against a downgrade to a previous version by an active MITM attack can be rendered useless by such mechanisms.[23]

SSL 2.0 is flawed in a variety of ways:[citation needed]

    Identical cryptographic keys are used for message authentication and encryption.
    SSL 2.0 has a weak MAC construction that uses the MD5 hash function with a secret prefix, making it vulnerable to length extension attacks.
    SSL 2.0 does not have any protection for the handshake, meaning a man-in-the-middle downgrade attack can go undetected.
    SSL 2.0 uses the TCP connection close to indicate the end of data. This means that truncation attacks are possible: the attacker simply forges a TCP FIN, leaving the recipient unaware of an illegitimate end of data message (SSL 3.0 fixes this problem by having an explicit closure alert).
    SSL 2.0 assumes a single service and a fixed domain certificate, which clashes with the standard feature of virtual hosting in Web servers. This means that most websites are practically impaired from using SSL.

SSL 2.0 is disabled by default, beginning with Internet Explorer 7,[24] Mozilla Firefox 2,[25] Opera and Safari. After it sends a TLS ClientHello, if Mozilla Firefox finds that the server is unable to complete the handshake, it will attempt to fall back to using SSL 3.0 with an SSL 3.0 ClientHello in SSL 2.0 format to maximize the likelihood of successfully handshaking with older servers.[26] Support for SSL 2.0 (and weak 40-bit and 56-bit ciphers) has been removed completely from Opera as of version 9.5.[27]

Modifications to the original protocols, like False Start (adopted and enabled by Google Chrome[28]) or Snap Start, have been reported to introduce limited TLS protocol version rollback attacks[29] or to allow modifications to the cipher suite list sent by the client to the server (an attacker may be able to influence the cipher suite selection in an attempt to downgrade the cipher suite strength, to use either a weaker symmetric encryption algorithm or a weaker key exchange[30]).

HTTP Secure - HTTPS

Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) is a widely used communications protocol for secure communication over a computer network, with especially wide deployment on the Internet. Technically, it is not a protocol in itself; rather, it is the result of simply layering the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) on top of the SSL/TLS protocol, thus adding the security capabilities of SSL/TLS to standard HTTP communications.

In its popular deployment on the internet, HTTPS provides authentication of the web site and associated web server that one is communicating with, which protects against Man-in-the-middle attacks. Additionally, it provides bidirectional encryption of communications between a client and server, which protects against eavesdropping and tampering with and/or forging the contents of the communication.[1] In practice, this provides a reasonable guarantee that one is communicating with precisely the web site that one intended to communicate with (as opposed to an impostor), as well as ensuring that the contents of communications between the user and site cannot be read or forged by any third party.

Because HTTPS piggybacks HTTP entirely on top of TLS, the entirety of the underlying HTTP protocol can be encrypted. This includes the request URL (which particular web page was requested), query parameters, headers, and cookies (which often contain identity information about the user). However, because host (web site) addresses and port numbers are necessarily part of the underlying TCP/IP protocols, HTTPS cannot protect their disclosure. In practice this means that even on a correctly configured web server eavesdroppers can still infer the IP address and port number of the web server (sometimes even the domain name e.g. www.example.org, but not the rest of the URL) that one is communicating with as well as the amount (data transferred) and duration (length of session) of the communication, though not the content of the communication.[citation needed]

Historically, HTTPS connections were primarily used for payment transactions on the World Wide Web, e-mail and for sensitive transactions in corporate information systems. In the late 2000s and early 2010s, HTTPS began to see widespread use for protecting page authenticity on all types of websites, securing accounts and keeping user communications, identity and web browsing private.

HTTPS is especially important over unencrypted networks such as WiFi as anyone on the same local network can do packet sniffing and discover sensitive information. Additionally, many free to use and even paid for WLAN networks do packet injection for serving their own ads on webpages or just for pranks, however this can be exploited maliciously e.g. by injecting malware and spying on users.[2] Another example where HTTPS is important is connections over Tor (anonymity network), as malicious Tor nodes can damage or alter the contents passing through them in an insecure fashion and inject malware into the connection. This is one reason why the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Torproject started the development of HTTPS Everywhere, which is included in the Tor Browser Bundle.

A site must be completely hosted over HTTPS, without having some of its contents loaded over HTTP, or the user will be vulnerable to some attacks and surveillance. E.g. Having scripts etc. loaded insecurely on a HTTPS page makes the user vulnerable to attacks. Also having only a certain page that contains sensitive information (such as a log-in page) of a website loaded over HTTPS, while having the rest of the website loaded over plain HTTP will expose the user to attacks. E.g. if the user first accesses the front page of the website with HTTP where he only after that clicks an HTTPS link to the log-in page, the session has already been compromised. On a site that has sensitive information somewhere on it, every time that site is accessed with HTTP instead of HTTPS, the user and the session will get exposed. Similarly, cookies on a site served through HTTPS have to have the secure attribute enabled.[3]

A common misconception is that HTTPS is performance heavy and cannot be deployed on existing equipment. This isn't true; deploying HTTPS requires no additional equipment or special hardware.[1][3] Deploying HTTPS also allows the use of SPDY, which is designed to reduce page load times and latency.

It is recommended to use HTTP Strict Transport Security with HTTPS to protect users from man-in-the-middle attacks.[3][4]

As of 2012-06-22 only 12.3% of the Internet's 186821 most popular web sites have a secure implementation of HTTPS. This leaves 87.7% (163776) open to some attacks.[5] This survey is powered by Qualys' SSL Server Test, in which anyone can audit the HTTPS implementation of a specified web server.

HTTPS should not be confused with the little-used Secure HTTP (S-HTTP) specified in RFC 2660.

Difference from HTTP

HTTPS URLs begin with "https://" and use port 443 by default, whereas HTTP URLs begin with "http://" and use port 80 by default.

HTTP is insecure and is subject to man-in-the-middle and eavesdropping attacks, which can let attackers gain access to website accounts and sensitive information. HTTPS is designed to withstand such attacks and is considered secure against such attacks (with the exception of older deprecated versions of SSL).

Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol PPTP

The Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) is a method for implementing virtual private networks. PPTP uses a control channel over TCP and a GRE tunnel operating to encapsulate PPP packets.

The PPTP specification does not describe encryption or authentication features and relies on the PPP protocol being tunneled to implement security functionality. However the most common PPTP implementation, shipping with the Microsoft Windows product families, implements various levels of authentication and encryption natively as standard features of the Windows PPTP stack. The intended use of this protocol is to provide similar levels of security and remote access as typical VPN products.

Specification

A specification for PPTP was published as RFC 2637[1] and was developed by a vendor consortium formed by Microsoft, Ascend Communications (today part of Alcatel-Lucent), 3Com, and others. PPTP has not been proposed nor ratified as a standard by the IETF.

A PPTP tunnel is instantiated by communication to the peer on TCP port 1723. This TCP connection is then used to initiate and manage a second GRE tunnel to the same peer.

The PPTP GRE packet format is non standard, including an additional acknowledgement field replacing the typical routing field in the GRE header. However, like in a normal GRE connection, those modified GRE packets are directly encapsulated into IP packets, and seen as IP protocol number 47.

The GRE tunnel is used to carry encapsulated PPP packets, allowing the tunnelling of any protocols that can be carried within PPP, including IP, NetBEUI and IPX.

In the Microsoft implementation, the tunneled PPP traffic can be authenticated with PAP, CHAP, MS-CHAP v1/v2 or EAP-TLS. The PPP payload is encrypted using Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption (MPPE) when using MS-CHAPv1/v2 or EAP-TLS. MPPE is described by RFC 3078

Implementations

PPTP was the first VPN protocol that was supported by Microsoft Dial-up Networking. All releases of Microsoft Windows since Windows 95 OSR2 are bundled with a PPTP client, although they are limited to only 2 concurrent outbound connections. Microsoft Windows Mobile 2003 and higher also support the PPTP protocol. The Routing and Remote Access Service for Microsoft Windows contains a PPTP server. The Microsoft implementation uses single DES in the MS-CHAP authentication protocol which many find unsuitable for data protection needs.

Windows Vista and later support the use of PEAP with PPTP. The authentication mechanisms supported are PEAPv0/EAP-MSCHAPv2 (passwords) and PEAP-TLS (smartcards and certificates). Windows Vista removed support for using the MSCHAP-v1 protocol to authenticate remote access connections.

Linux server-side support for PPTP is provided by the PoPToP daemon. and kernel modules for PPP and MPPE. The first PPTP implementation was developed by Matthew Ramsay in 1999. and initially distributed under the GNU GPL by Moreton Bay. However, Linux distributions initially lacked full PPTP support because MPPE was believed to be patent encumbered. Full MPPE support was added to the Linux kernel in the 2.6.14 release on October 28, 2005. SuSE Linux 10 was the first Linux distribution to provide a complete working PPTP client. There is also ACCEL-PPP - PPTP/L2TP/PPPoE server for Linux. which supports PPTP in kernel-mode.

OS X and iOS are bundled with a PPTP client. Cisco and Efficient Networks sell PPTP clients for older Mac OS releases. Palm PDA devices with Wi-Fi are bundled with the Mergic PPTP client.[citation needed]

Many different Mobile phones with Android as operating system support PPTP as well

Security

PPTP has been the subject of many security analyses and serious security vulnerabilities have been found in the protocol. The known vulnerabilities relate to the underlying PPP authentication protocols used, the design of the MPPE protocol as well as the integration between MPPE and PPP authentication for session key establishment.

A summary of these vulnerabilities is below:

    MSCHAP-v1 is fundamentally insecure. Tools exist to trivially extract the NT Password hashes from a captured MSCHAP-v1 exchange.
    When using MSCHAP-v1, MPPE uses the same RC4 session key for encryption in both directions of the communication flow. This can be cryptanalysed with standard methods by XORing the streams from each direction together.
    MSCHAP-v2 is vulnerable to dictionary attack on the captured challenge response packets. Tools exist to perform this process rapidly.
    In 2012 it was shown that brute-force attack on MSCHAP-v2 is equivalent to single DES key brute-force attack. Online service was presented, which is capable to restore MSCHAP-v2 passphrase's MD4 in 23 hours.
    MPPE uses RC4 stream cipher for encryption. There is no method for authentication of the ciphertext stream and therefore the ciphertext is vulnerable to a bit-flipping attack. An attacker could modify the stream in transit and adjust single bits to change the output stream without possibility of detection. These bit flips may be detected by the protocols themselves through checksums or other means.

EAP-TLS is seen as the superior authentication choice for PPTP;  however, it requires implementation of a Public Key Infrastructure for both client and server certificates. As such it is not a viable authentication option for many remote access installations.

Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol SSTP

Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) is a form of VPN tunnel that provides a mechanism to transport PPP or L2TP traffic through an SSL 3.0 channel. SSL provides transport-level security with key-negotiation, encryption and traffic integrity checking. The use of SSL over TCP port 443 allows SSTP to pass through virtually all firewalls and proxy servers.

SSTP servers must be authenticated during the SSL phase. SSTP clients can optionally be authenticated during the SSL phase, and must be authenticated in the PPP phase. The use of PPP allows support for common authentication methods, such as EAP-TLS and MS-CHAP.

SSTP is available for Linux, Mac OS, BSD and Windows.

For Windows, SSTP is only available since version Windows Vista SP1, in RouterOS, and in SEIL since its firmware version 3.50. It is fully integrated with the RRAS architecture in these operating systems, allowing its use with Winlogon or smart card authentication, remote access policies and the Windows VPN client.

SSTP is only for remote client access, it does not support site-to-site VPN tunnels.

SSTP suffers from the same performance limitations as any other IP-over-TCP tunnel. In general, performance will be acceptable only as long as there is sufficient excess bandwidth on the un-tunneled network link to guarantee that the tunneled TCP timers do not expire. If this becomes untrue, performance falls off dramatically. This is known as the "TCP meltdown problem

L2TP/IPsec

Because of the lack of confidentiality inherent in the L2TP protocol, it is often implemented along with IPsec. This is referred to as L2TP/IPsec, and is standardized in IETF RFC 3193. The process of setting up an L2TP/IPsec VPN is as follows:

        Negotiation of IPsec security association (SA), typically through Internet key exchange (IKE). This is carried out over UDP port 500, and commonly uses either a shared password (so-called "pre-shared keys"), public keys, or X.509 certificates on both ends, although other keying methods exist.
        Establishment of Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) communication in transport mode. The IP protocol number for ESP is 50 (compare TCP's 6 and UDP's 17). At this point, a secure channel has been established, but no tunneling is taking place.
        Negotiation and establishment of L2TP tunnel between the SA endpoints. The actual negotiation of parameters takes place over the SA's secure channel, within the IPsec encryption. L2TP uses UDP port 1701.

When the process is complete, L2TP packets between the endpoints are encapsulated by IPsec. Since the L2TP packet itself is wrapped and hidden within the IPsec packet, no information about the internal private network can be garnered from the encrypted packet. Also, it is not necessary to open UDP port 1701 on firewalls between the endpoints, since the inner packets are not acted upon until after IPsec data has been decrypted and stripped, which only takes place at the endpoints.

A potential point of confusion in L2TP/IPsec is the use of the terms tunnel and secure channel. The term tunnel refers to a channel which allows untouched packets of one network to be transported over another network. In the case of L2TP/PPP, it allows L2TP/PPP packets to be transported over IP. A secure channel refers to a connection within which the confidentiality of all data is guaranteed. In L2TP/IPsec, first IPsec provides a secure channel, then L2TP provides a tunnel.

L2TP packet exchange

At the time of setup of L2TP connection, many control packets are exchanged between server and client to establish tunnel and session for each direction. One peer requests the other peer to assign a specific tunnel and session id through these control packets. Then using this tunnel and session id, data packets are exchanged with the compressed PPP frames as payload.

The list of L2TP Control messages exchanged between LAC and LNS, for handshaking before establishing a tunnel and session in voluntary tunneling method are

Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol

In computer networking, Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) is a tunneling protocol used to support virtual private networks (VPNs) or as part of the delivery of services by ISPs. It does not provide any encryption or confidentiality by itself; it relies on an encryption protocol that it passes within the tunnel to provide privacy.

History

Published in 1999 as proposed standard RFC 2661, L2TP has its origins primarily in two older tunneling protocols for Point-to-Point communication: Cisco's Layer 2 Forwarding Protocol (L2F) and USRobotics Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP). A new version of this protocol, L2TPv3, was published as proposed standard RFC 3931 in 2005. L2TPv3 provides additional security features, improved encapsulation, and the ability to carry data links other than simply PPP over an IP network (e.g., Frame Relay, Ethernet, ATM, etc.).

Description

The entire L2TP packet, including payload and L2TP header, is sent within a User Datagram Protocol (UDP) datagram. It is common to carry Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) sessions within an L2TP tunnel. L2TP does not provide confidentiality or strong authentication by itself. IPsec is often used to secure L2TP packets by providing confidentiality, authentication and integrity. The combination of these two protocols is generally known as L2TP/IPsec (discussed below).

The two endpoints of an L2TP tunnel are called the LAC (L2TP Access Concentrator) and the LNS (L2TP Network Server). The LAC is the initiator of the tunnel while the LNS is the server, which waits for new tunnels. Once a tunnel is established, the network traffic between the peers is bidirectional. To be useful for networking, higher-level protocols are then run through the L2TP tunnel. To facilitate this, an L2TP session (or 'call') is established within the tunnel for each higher-level protocol such as PPP. Either the LAC or LNS may initiate sessions. The traffic for each session is isolated by L2TP, so it is possible to set up multiple virtual networks across a single tunnel. MTU should be considered when implementing L2TP.

The packets exchanged within an L2TP tunnel are categorized as either control packets or data packets. L2TP provides reliability features for the control packets, but no reliability for data packets. Reliability, if desired, must be provided by the nested protocols running within each session of the L2TP tunnel.

L2TP packet structure

An L2TP packet consists of :
Bits 0–15                          Bits 16–31
Flags and Version Info     Length (opt)
Tunnel ID                        Session ID
Ns (opt)                           Nr (opt)
Offset Size (opt)             Offset Pad (opt)......
Payload data

Field meanings:

Flags and version
    control flags indicating data/control packet and presence of length, sequence, and offset fields.
Length (optional)
    Total length of the message in bytes, present only when length flag is set.
Tunnel ID
    Indicates the identifier for the control connection.
Session ID
    Indicates the identifier for a session within a tunnel.
Ns (optional)
    sequence number for this data or control message, beginning at zero and incrementing by one (modulo 216) for each message sent. Present only when sequence flag set.
Nr (optional)
    sequence number for expected message to be received. Nr is set to the Ns of the last in-order message received plus one (modulo 216). In data messages, Nr is reserved and, if present (as indicated by the S bit), MUST be ignored upon receipt..
Offset Size (optional)
    Specifies where payload data is located past the L2TP header. If the offset field is present, the L2TP header ends after the last byte of the offset padding. This field exists if the offset flag is set.
Offset Pad (optional)
    Variable length, as specified by the offset size. Contents of this field are undefined.
Payload data
    Variable length (Max payload size = Max size of UDP packet − size of L2TP header)